Läs nu Paul Krugmans åsikter
Nobelpristagarens attack: Han har sänkt Sverige
Utdrag från Min Blogg i september 2012 --
"Reporäntan. Okunskap eller ovilja, hur är det med Riksbanksdirektionen?
Två ledamöter, tillika professorer i ekonomi, råder en annan väg, större sänkning. En av dessa ledamöter har dessutom uttryckt i ganska tydliga ordalag att en kompetenshöjning skulle vara positiv i Riksbanken då man "saknade goda kunskaper om makroekonomi, penningpolitik och finansiell stabilitet", och gärna fler professorer (med rätt bakgrund).
I DN 8 september, verkar det som denne ledamot tvingas ta tillbaka och släta över det han uttryckt i tidigare, många "det innebär inte..." och att det "vinklas och tolkas". Vad som kvarstår är "att det saknas en ordentlig och utförlig diskussion om argument för/emot olika beslutsalternativ" men att det är fullt möjligt att genomföra. Frågan man kan ställa sig är "varför" gör man inte det då?
Är det ovilja eller okunskap, om hur allvarligt läget verkligen är. I båda dessa fall skulle det rådas att Riksdagsfullmäktige behöver ta en funderare på vilken kompetens som egentligen ska sitta i Riksbankens direktionen."
Sverige har gått från en stark ekonomi till att i dag mer likna Japan med stagnation och deflation. Det skriver ekonomiprofessorn och Nobelpristagaren Paul Krugman i New York Times och pekar ut vem i Sverige som är den "skyldige".
Stefan Ingves borde ha fört en mer expansiv penningpolitik mer lik den som tidigare vice riksbankschefen Lars E O Svensson förespråkade
"Sweden
Turns Japanese"
APRIL 20, 2014
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Three years ago Sweden was widely regarded as a role model in how to deal
with a global crisis. The nation’s exports were hit hard by slumping world
trade but snapped back; its well-regulated banks rode out the financial storm;
its strong social insurance programs supported consumer demand; and unlike much
of Europe, it still had its own currency, giving it much-needed flexibility. By
mid-2010 output was surging, and unemployment was falling fast. Sweden, declared The Washington Post, was “the rock star
of the recovery.”
Then the sadomonetarists moved in.
The story so far:
In 2010 Sweden’s economy was doing much better than those
of most other advanced countries. But unemployment was still high, and inflation was low. Nonetheless, the Riksbank —
Sweden’s equivalent of the Federal Reserve — decided to start raising interest
rates.
There was some dissent within the Riksbank over this decision. Lars
Svensson, a deputy governor at the time — and a former Princeton colleague of
mine — vociferously opposed the rate hikes.
Mr. Svensson, one of the world’s leading experts on Japanese-style deflationary
traps, warned that raising interest rates in a still-depressed economy put
Sweden at risk of a similar outcome. But he found himself isolated, and left
the Riksbank in 2013.
Sure enough, Swedish unemployment stopped falling soon after the rate hikes
began. Deflation took a little longer, but it eventually arrived. The rock star
of the recovery has turned itself into Japan.
So why did the Riksbank make such a terrible mistake? That’s a hard
question to answer, because officials changed their story over time. At first
the bank’s governor declared that it was all about heading off inflation: “If
the interest rate isn’t raised now, we’ll run the risk of too much inflation
further ahead ... Our most important task is to ensure that we meet our inflation target of 2
percent.” But as inflation slid toward zero, falling ever further below that
supposedly crucial target, the Riksbank offered a new rationale: tight money
was about curbing a housing bubble, to avert financial instability.
That is, as the situation changed, officials invented new rationales for an
unchanging policy.
In short, this was a classic case of sadomonetarism in action.
I’m using that term (coined by William Keegan of The Observer) advisedly,
not just to be colorful. At least as I define it, sadomonetarism is an
attitude, common among monetary officials and commentators, that involves a
visceral dislike for low interest rates and easy money, even when unemployment
is high and inflation is low. You find many sadomonetarists at international
organizations; in the United States they tend to dwell on Wall Street or in
right-leaning economics departments. They don’t, I’m happy to say, exert much
influence at the Federal Reserve — but they do constantly harass the Fed,
demanding that it stop its efforts to boost employment.
for their policy views, they don’t change their policy views in response to
changing conditions — they just invent new rationales. This strongly suggests
that what we’re looking at here is a gut feeling rather than a thought-out
position.
Indeed, the Riksbank’s evolving justifications for rate hikes were mirrored
at international organizations like the Switzerland-based Bank for International Settlements,
an influential bankers’ bank that is a sadomonetarist stronghold. Just like the
Riksbank, the bank changed its rationale for rate hikes — It’s about inflation!
It’s about financial stability! — but never its policy demands.
Where does this gut dislike for low rates come from? At some level it has
to reflect an instinctive identification with the interests of wealthy
creditors as opposed to usually poorer debtors. But it’s also driven, I
believe, by the desire of many monetary officials to pose as serious,
tough-minded people — and to demonstrate how tough they are by inflicting pain.
Whatever their motives, sadomonetarists have already done a lot of damage.
In Sweden they have extracted defeat from the jaws of victory, turning an
economic success story into a tale of stagnation and deflation as far as the
eye can see.
And they could do much more damage in the future. Financial markets have
been fairly calm lately — no big banking crises, no imminent threats of euro
breakup. But it would be wrong and dangerous to assume that recovery is
assured: bad policies could all too easily undermine our still-sluggish
economic progress. So when serious-sounding men in dark suits tell you that
it’s time to stop all this easy money and raise rates, beware: Look at what
such people have done to Sweden.
A version of
this op-ed appears in print on April 21, 2014, on page A21 of the New York
edition with the headline: Sweden Turns Japanese.
